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One can approach the Supreme Court's recent school desegrega-
tion decision, Missouri v. Jenkins,1 from several theoretical per-
spectives. Like previous school desegregation opinions, Jenkins
implicates the role of the courts,2 the appropriate power of local
government,3 and issues of race and racism.4 Although a political
theory cohering these and other perspectives would be a signifi-
cant achievement, such a theory would inevitably be both too ab-
stract and too controversial to help lawyers seeking to understand
Jenkins.
This essay will instead focus on the public school "ideal."5 Citi-
zens who elect school board members and residents who pay taxes
to fund public schools share a basic understanding of what consti-
tutes a public school.6 The meaning of "public school," however,
varies depending on the aspirations of the community supporting
* B.A., Yale University, 1992; J.D., University of Chicago, 1995. Law clerk for the United
States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.
1 115 S. Ct. 2038 (1995).
2 See Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2062 (Thomas, J., concurring); see also GERALD ROSENBURG,
THE HoLLow HOPE 9-28 (1991).
3 See Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I-The Structure of Local Government Law,
90 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 94 (1990).
4 See Robert L. Hayman, Jr. & Nancy Levit, The Constitutional Ghetto, 1993 Wis. L.
REv. 627, 656-58.
5 See Introduction, Symposium, Changing Images of the State, 107 HARv. L. REV. 1179,
1179 (1994). "The image of the state that we start with-the state's powers and limits, the
dangers it poses, and the promise it provides-often shapes legal arguments." Id.
6 See Amy GuTmANN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION 7 (1987). Gutmann suggests that "social
goods [such as education] have social meanings." Id.; MICmHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUS-
TICE 19 (1986) [hereinafter SPHERES OF JUSTICE]; see also MICHAEL WALZER, THICK AND
ThiN: MORAL ARGUMENT AT HoME AND ABROAD 26 (1994); Jerry Frug, Decentering Decen-
tralization, 60 U. CHL. L. REV. 253, 279 (1993) (applying Walzer's more general argument
about self-identity to issues of local government law).
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the school.7 These aspirations are reflected in the character of a
"place."8 The location of a school informs the meaning of school.
One criticism of "the public school ideal" approach is that it
risks missing any larger point the Court is making. For example,
reading Brown v. Board of Education9 as a "school" desegregation
decision probably understates, or even distorts, the more univer-
sal teaching of Brown.10 Nevertheless, in the pragmatic view pro-
moted recently by Judge Richard Posner, the usefulness of a per-
spective ought to be judged by its practical payoff.11 Focussing on
the public school ideal is useful, or so this essay tries to show.
This article discusses the meaning of "public school" in the
Supreme Court's recent school desegregation decisions. Part One
compares two places, the suburban township and the urban city,
and the meaning that residents of these communities ascribe to
their public schools. Part Two describes the Court's recent school
desegregation cases, focussing on Missouri v. Jenkins. Part Three
analyzes the Supreme Court's understanding of "public school."
This Part argues that the Court's desegregation decisions illus-
trate that the Court assumes a suburban place, a neighborhood
school, when it reasons about public schools. Part Three then ar-
gues that the assumption of neighborhood schools results in em-
phasizing the quality of education aspect to school desegragation.
Part Three closes by arguing that the neighborhood school
asssumption overlooks school desegregation's urban location; de-
segregation is an urban, not suburban, phenomenon.
7 See ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETmics AND ECONOMICS 94 (1993) (noting that dif-
ferent communities properly have different ideals and therefore social goods, such as edu-
cation, have different meanings depending on each community).
8 See Roger K Lewis, "Gated" Areas: Start of New Middle Ages, WASH. POST, Sept. 9,
1995, at El; George F. Will, Our Towns, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 1995, § 7, at 1 (discussing
favorable book review of City Life: Urban Expectations in a New World by Witold Rybczyn-
ski and noting our cities reflect attributes we possess).
9 347 U.S. 483 (1954)
10 See Richard A. Posner, The Learned Hand Biography and the Question of Judicial
Greatness, 104 YALE L.J. 512, 519 (1995) (explaining Brown's holding as easier to defend
once it was applied in noneducational settings); see also J. Harvie Wilkinson III, The Law
of Civil Rights and Dangers of Separatism in Multicultural America, 47 STAN. L. REV. 993,
998 (1995).
11 See RicHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAw 11 (1995); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE
PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 309 (1990); see also Cass R. Sunstein, The Idea of a Useable
Past, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 601, 607 (1995).
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DESEGREGATING AN IDEAL
I. PLACES AND THEIR PUBLIC SCHOOLS
A. The Suburban Township and the Urban City
The suburb is a physical manifestation of at least three values.
Richard Briffault describes how the "essence of the suburban
model is the association of home and family."' 2 For example, he
argues that in Milliken v. Bradley13 (Milliken I) the Supreme
Court adopted the notion that suburban governments are "defend-
ers of local families and homes." 4
In addition to family and homes, the suburb reflects decisions to
live near those who share certain demographic characteristics,
most often income and race. Thus, Justice O'Connor's recent de-
scription of "white flight" as the result of "natural, if unfortunate,
demographic forces" 15 recognizes that some people strongly prefer
to live with people who share certain demographic similarities.
The suburbs are exclusive.
The suburbs also represent notions of"community." A township
conjures up visions of mythic New England town meetings, bas-
tions of citizen control, participation and responsibility. The self-
image of the suburbs is the place about which DeToqueville
wrote. 1
6
Describing the values represented by the urban city is harder.
Briffault criticizes the Court and legal theory for not distinguish-
ing between the suburb and the city. ' 7 Yet, he does not attempt to
describe an "urban model." Similarly, Professor Richard Ford ar-
gues that legal theory should focus on urban life as a normative
12 See Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part II-Localism and Legal Theories, 90
COLUM. L. REV. 346, 381 (1990).
13 418 U.S. 717 (1976).
14 See Briffault, supra note 12, at 387.
15 Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 2038, 2060 (1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
16 See Frug, supra note 6, at 279. There are, of course, many possible descriptions of the
suburb. Id. This article's description ignores the relationship between the suburbs and the
urban city. Id. As Professor Frug writes, "suburbs would not be what they are without this
love/hate relationship [that they have] with the city... [and] there would, for example, be
no place for those excluded by exclusionary zoning to live except the suburbs." Id. School
desegregation, indeed, Jenkins itself, involves this relationship. Id. Nevertheless, the sub-
urban self-image ignores the urban city and so it is omitted from the description here. Id.
17 See Briffault, supra note 12, at 349. "Cities and suburbs differ from each other politi-
cally, economically and socially notwithstanding these differences, local government law
does not distinguish between city and suburb." Id.
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ideal. 8 To strive for the ideal, however, we need a nuanced de-
scription of the ideal urban city.19
A positive description of urban America must acknowledge the
variety, spontaneity, energy, individuality, and accommodation
urban communities offer. "Great cities" are "great" because of
their diversity of people, industry and architecture, and so on.2 °
The "urban idea" consists of a city's culture, its physical form, and
"its unique capacity for accommodating disparate individuals
within a shared environment.21 " Our urban cities reflect this
country's ideals of "democracy and toleration."2 2 These attributes
attract people, from within and beyond the nation's borders, to the
urban cities.
B. The Meaning of Public School
The ideal suburban neighborhood public school has many of the
characteristics of its surroundings. Public schools are the public
service which is most closely associated with the idea of family.23
As Michael Walzer notes, parents are often more concerned with
their child's classmates than with their child's curriculum.24 In
the suburbs, the public school is almost always the neighborhood
school which is attended by children from similar backgrounds,
family life and homes. Local government control and participa-
tion is reflected and reinforced by the suburban public school.
In the same way, the ideal urban public school system is com-
prised of the attributes of cities. An urban public school board op-
erates many schools in order to allow every different child in the
city to attend school.25 Each urban school within a given system is
independent from other urban schools within the same system.
Teachers and students rarely change schools, but are connected to
18 See Richard T. Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in Legal Analysis,
107 HAnv. L. REv. 1841, 1908 (1994). "We must redescribe city life as a normative ideal."
Id. "Urban life bring[s] glimpses of what is best about plural culture." Id.
19 See id. at 1908 (explaining necessity for positive view of urban life).
20 See generally JANE JACOBS, CrrIEs AND THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 222-38 (1984).
21 See Lewis, supra note 8, at E14.
22 See Will, supra note 8, at 13.
23 See Briffault, supra note 12, at 385.
24 See SPHERES OF JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 215. "Parents take a much livelier interest in
the schoolmates than in the schoolbooks of their children.... [they are right to do so....
s]ince so much of what we know we learn from our peers, whom and what always go to-
gether." Id.




other city schools by a similar curriculum and a single school
board. Thus, urban public schools are an expression of unity de-
spite difference and an accommodation, rather than an avoidance
of diversity.
Despite this contrast between suburban and urban public school
ideals, in many important ways the public school ideal does not
change with the location. For example, religion plays a fairly cir-
cumscribed role in every public school ideal, regardless of its loca-
tion.2 6 Nevertheless, a complete understanding of a public school
ideal requires a rough description of the number of schools and
students included in the system, the demographic diversity or ho-
mogeneity, the organization of the staff, administrators and
faculty who run the school and who are accountable for its success.
Those who discuss the ideal public school usually have a particu-
lar place in mind for that school in the suburbs.
II. RECENT SUPREME COURT'S SCHOOL
DESEGREGATION DECISIONS
A. Dowell, Freeman and Jenkins
After more than a decade of silence, the Supreme Court has re-
turned its attention to school desegregation. The 1991 decision,
Board of Education v. Dowell,2" set forth the standard for ending
district court supervision of the desegregation of a school dis-
trict.2" The Court held that in order for a court to terminate its
supervision of a school, the school board must show that it has
operated in compliance with constitutional standards and that
"the vestiges of past discrimination had been eliminated to the ex-
tent practicable."29
Soon after Dowell, the Court revisited the issue of a district
court's ceasing supervision of a school board. In Freeman v. Pitts3 °
the issue was whether a district court could stop supervising cer-
tain aspects of the school system while retaining supervision over
26 U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment guarantees the free exercise of religion.
Id.
27 498 U.S. 237 (1991).
28 See id. at 240-41. The school district in Dowell had unconstitutionally segregated stu-
dents and was therefore under the supervision of a district court. Id.
29 See id. at 248, 250. The Court found that a school board must demonstrate that it has
operated in accordance with the Constitution for a reasonable time period and that "the
vestiges of past discrimination had been eliminated to the extent practicable." Id.
30 503 U.S. 467 (1992).
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other areas of education. The Court held that the district court
has discretion to order either a partial or absolute withdrawal of
its supervision and control. 3'
Missouri v. Jenkins32 moves beyond the relatively narrow ques-
tion of when and to what extent a district court is permitted to
relinquish control of a school system to the question of what a su-
pervising district court may order a desegregating school board to
do. This area of law is quite complex3 3 as well as controversial.
For background, a brief description of the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Milliken I,34 the Court's most important case restricting
the authority of the district court, is necessary.35
The Milliken I Court struck down a regional busing order that
included schools in Detroit and its surrounding suburbs.36 The
Court held that local government, specifically in this case, a sub-
urban school board, could not be forced to comply with a court de-
segregation order when the local entity itself had done nothing
wrong.37
In Jenkins, the Court returned to the Milliken I question of in-
terdistrict remedies. The Jenkins district court had ordered both
the State and the local school boards to improve the quality of the
city public schools to attract white students from both inside and
outside the school district.3 The State argued that Milliken 's
principle of local autonomy was not implicated because local gov-
ernment entities were not forced to comply with the order. 9
The Court gave two reasons for holding the voluntary interdis-
trict order beyond the court's remedial authority. First, the dis-
trict court's effort to integrate students from outside the district
31 See id. at 489.
32 115 S. Ct. 2038 (1995).
33 See CASS SUNsTEiN, THE PARTIAL. CONSTITUTION 330 (1993) (describing school desegre-
gation cases as "exceedingly complex").
34 Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
35 See Mark S. Davies, 'Virtually Integrated Classrooms': Using the Internet to Eliminate
the Effects of Unconstitutional Racial Segregation in the Public Schools, 24 J. L. & EDUC.
569, 577 (1995).
36 Id. at 752-53.
37 Id. at 746-47; see also SPHERES OF JusrIcE, supra note 6, at 222; Ford, supra note 18,
at 1875.
38 See Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 2038, 2042-43 (1995) (noting history of Jenkins
result, which was to restore Kansas City, Missouri school district to AAA rating by imple-
menting several court-imposed measures).
39 See Respondent's Oral Argument at *37, Missouri v. Jenkins, 1995 WL 61093 (1995)
(No. 93-1823) (arguing that district court's order was acceptable because it was voluntary
and therefore did not impinge upon autonomy of suburban school districts); see also Jen-
kins, 115 S. Ct. at 2048.
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calls for massive expenditures in an effort to attract white stu-
dents.4 ° Persuading students from outside the district to attend
the school is expensive.41 Second, and related, permitting the dis-
trict court to retain authority while the school seeks to attract stu-
dents from outside the district justifies lengthy district court su-
pervision of the school and thereby overrides the local autonomy of
schools.42 Under Jenkins, a supervising district court exceeds its
remedial authority when it orders voluntary measures to attract
students from outside of the district because such a remedy is too
expensive and too lengthy.
B. The Jenkins Puzzle
It is tempting to read Jenkins as another retreat from the goal
of school desegregation. Some commentators have read Dowell
and Freeman as being profoundly anti-school desegregation opin-
ions.43 The Jenkins Court's refusal to allow the district court to
involve, even voluntarily, students from outside the school district
fits with this view. Moreover, with its concern for expense and
duration, Jenkins can be seen as an implicit attack on even single-
district voluntary measures, which are also often expensive and
lengthy.
The "animus" thesis is undermined, however, at least to some
extent, by the Jenkins Court's apparent approval of voluntary sin-
gle district desegregation efforts. The Court expressly noted the
advantages of using magnet schools as single-district remedies,
stating that such voluntary measures avoid extensive busing and
limit the number of white students that withdraw from the public
school district.44
This apparent approval of voluntary single-district desegrega-
tion efforts in turn undermines the Court's rationale for striking
down the multi-district plan in Jenkins. School districts in Chi-
cago, Illinois and Prince George County, Maryland have expended
large amounts of time and money trying, with limited success, to
40 See Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2048.
41 See id. at 2043 (estimating total spending on quality of education programs at $220
million and on magnet schools at $448 million).
42 SPHEREs OF JUSTICE, supra note 6. The concern with limiting the time that schools
must operate under the desegregation order is often expressed as an argument about the
"effects" of segregation. Id.
43 See Hayman & Levit, supra note 4, at 677.
44 Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 2038, 2051 (1995).
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encourage white students from within the district to choose to at-
tend magnet schools.45 It may be, as the Court evidently believes,
that the expense and duration of desegregation are worse when
schools are permitted to include students from outside the district.
But, if large numbers of the students from outside a district can be
recruited, eliminating racial imbalance may ultimately be cheaper
and quicker.46
The puzzle of Jenkins is that the Court does not explain why the
school district line matters. The cost and duration of a remedy
may increase with the number of districts involved but may also
decrease. The rationale of Milliken I, which supports autonomy of
the school board, does not support the conclusion in Jenkins be-
cause neither a school board nor autonomy was involved. Here,
the plan involved students from other school districts, not school
boards, and, more fundamentally, the interdistrict plan was vol-
untary not mandatory. Despite the lack of elaboration, Jenkins
illustrates that the Court wants to respect local school district
lines.
III. DESEGREGATING NEIGHBORHOOD SCHOOLS
A. The Supreme Court's Definition of Public School: Solving
the Jenkins Puzzle
The Court's recent school desegregation cases suggest that a
majority of the Court imagines public schools as suburban neigh-
borhood schools. 47 Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the major-
ity in Dowell, argued that local control of education allows citizens
to participate in decision making and permits schools to adapt to
local needs. 48 In the Freeman decision, Justice Kennedy opined
that local schools promote accountability and that local control
45 See John Kass & Rick Pearson, Daley Quickly Flexes School Muscle, CHI. TRn., May
25, 1995, at Al. "[Sichools have a student population that is 89% minority, yet the system
spends about $117 million each year to meet desegregation guidelines, including about $35
million for busing programs, that school officials say are impossible to attain given that
only one percent of the students are white." Id.; Lawrence Sherrod, Magnet Program May
Be Modified, Board Plans to Ask Permission to Rewrite Racial Requirements, PRINCE GEO.
J., Oct. 30, 1995. Sherrod reports that the 10% white requirement has led to a waiting list
that is 91% black in the $13 million magnet school program. Id.
46 See, e.g., JENNIFER HosctILD, Tim NEW AMERIcAN DILEMMA 75 (1984).
47 See Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. at 2048 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
48 See Board ofEduc. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237,247 (1991) (citing Milliken v. Bradley, 418
U.S. 717, 742 (1974) (Milliken I)).
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over public schools is a "vital national tradition,"4 9 a line thereaf-
ter incorporated into the opinion of the Court in Jenkins.
Although not incontrovertible, these paeans to local control sug-
gest that the Court thinks in terms of suburban schools.
The Jenkins Court respects school district lines because the
Court understands public schools to be suburban neighborhood
schools. Attracting students from outside the school district is un-
acceptable because it is inconsistent with the belief that public
schools serve the local neighborhood. Likewise, spending a lot of
money to encourage students from outside the district to attend a
school, which was done by the district court in Jenkins, is incon-
sistent with the vision of the local public school that serves its own
neighborhood. Placing emphasis on the neighborhood character of
public schools explains why the Jenkins Court respects school dis-
trict lines.
B. Neighborhood Schools and Quality of Education
Reading Jenkins as a suburban neighborhood school opinion,
rather than a straightforward anti-desegregation opinion, still
leaves the Court vulnerable to the charge that it no longer be-
lieves in school desegregation. As the Court acknowledges, in a
country where people of different races rarely live together,5" a
commitment to maintaining neighborhood public schools is tanta-
mount to encouraging racially isolated schools. 51
Despite this racially isolating result, a commitment to main-
taining neighborhood public schools is not necessarily indicative of
an end to the Court's effort to desegregate the schools. In Milliken
11,52 the Court approved the district court's order which required
the school board to fund remedial educational programs.5" There
is a long tradition which argues that school desegregation is most
49 See Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 490 (1992) (quoting Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brink-
man, 433 U.S. 406, 410 (1971)).
50 See SPHERES OF JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 117. "The residential segregation of black
Americans is very different than that of other groups: a great deal more thoroughgoing and
a great deal less voluntary." Id. at 62.
51 Cf SPHERES OF JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 117 (citing Green v. County Sch. Bd. of New
Kent County, 391 U.S. 430 (1968), as traditional neighborhood school's opinion but noting
that neighborhood at issue was racially integrated).
52 433 U.S. 267 (1977).
53 See Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 287 (1977). The Court stated that:
Children who have been thus educationally and culturally set apart from the larger
community will inevitably acquire habits of speech, conduct and attitudes reflecting
cultural isolation. They are likely to acquire speech habits, for example, which vary
1995]
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fundamentally related to the quality of education. For neighbor-
hood schools not to be equated with abandoning school desegraga-
tion, strong local schools must promote "an American vision in
which shared purposes, common efforts, and interracial partner-
ships remain the goal."54
Milliken II quality of education programs are likely to continue
to be looked upon favorably by the Court because the aim of im-
proving the quality of education at a local school reinforces, rather
than overrides, the understanding that public schools are neigh-
borhood schools. Justice O'Connor, who has determined the out-
come in many recent cases involving race, 55 noted in her Jenkins
concurrence that "the district court may be able to justify some
remedies without reliance on these goals."56 She did not suggest
any particular rationale, but she may have had a Milliken II
"quality of education" argument in mind. In other words, the
Court might uphold an expensive and lengthy desegregation order
that was aimed solely at improving the quality of education at lo-
cal schools.
C. Desegregating Urban School Systems
The Supreme Court's understanding that public schools are by
definition suburban neighborhood schools is a mistake. Milliken I
ensures that many suburban schools are not under desegregation
orders. A suburban school board is rarely ordered to integrate its
single neighborhood school.57 City school districts are the districts
that are operating under school desegregation orders.
from the environment in which they must ultimately function and compete, if they are
to enter and be apart of that community.
Id.; see also Keyes v. Denver Sch. Dist., 413 U.S. 189, 238 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring in
part & dissenting in part). See generally WILKINSON, supra note 10, at 164.
54 See WILKINSON, supra note 10, at 998; see also SPHERES OF JUSTICE, supra note 6, at
225. Walzer reconciles his effort to promote justice with the priority of local communities by
insisting that all local schools be "strong." Id. "When every neighborhood has its own strong
school, then justice has been done." Id. In words that mirror a sentence quoted by the Jen-
kins Court, he writes: "the goal of an integrated society was never a reason for going beyond
the remedies required to end wilful segregation." Id. at 226. If everyone has a good, albeit
racially isolated, education, then "children are equals within a complex set of distributive
arrangements." Id. at 225. Furthermore, Walzer concedes that "neighborhood schools keep
black and white children apart" and acknowledges the "harsh criticism" this result has
caused. Id. Nevertheless, he maintains that local schools are "the preferred principle." Id.
This claim is weakened by his insistence that neighborhoods be "open." Id.
55 See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 2097 (1995); Shaw v
Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2816 (1993).
56 See Jenkins v. Missouri, 115 S. Ct. 2038, 2061 (1995).
57 See WILINSON, supra note 10, at 222 (noting that Milliken I Court "saved" suburbs).
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The urban rather than suburban location of current school de-
segregation is illustrated by the school districts involved in the
Court's most recent desegregation cases. In Board of Educ. v.
Dowell ,58 the Oklahoma City Board of Education operated sixty-
four elementary schools 59 to educate over 18,000 students.6 0 In
Freeman, the school board, which was operating under a desegre-
gation order, was serving some 73,000 students from kindergarten
through high school.6 ' Similarly, the Jenkins Kansas City school
board was responsible for 37,151 students. In 1990, school dis-
tricts in many cities throughout the country were under federal
court orders to desegregate. 62 Urban school boards with immense
responsibilities, hundreds of thousands of students and numerous
schools are the boards that are forced to desegregate their schools.
The Court's assumption that public schools mean suburban
neighborhood schools when the Court is in fact deciding issues in-
volving urban school systems leads to two problems. First, the
Court over-emphasizes local accountability and citizen participa-
tion. It is difficult to argue for granting more authority to the ur-
ban school board based on values such as local participation and
accountability. More often, advocates of accountability and local
participation seek to remove power from the centralized city
school boards.63 Although the urban school boards are probably
more accountable than district courts, the Court is not a champion
of accountability and local participation when it increases the
power of an urban school board.
Not only has ignoring school desegregation's location led to an
overemphasis on citizen participation and accountability, the
same oversight caused the Jenkins Court to be unduly skeptical of
attempts to attract students to the urban school district. Urban
public schools, like the cities themselves, strive to attract students
from outside the city limits. Just as the arts and industry of ur-
58 498 U.S. 237 (1991).
59 Id. at 242.
60 Dowell v. Board of Educ., 890 F.2d 1483, 1511 (10th Cir. 1989), rev'd, 498 U.S. 237
(1991).
61 See Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 471 (1992).
62 See James S. Liebman, Desegregating Politics: "All-Out" School Desegregation Ex-
plained, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1463, 1469-70 (1990).
63 See generally Joseph A. Kirby, For New York's New Schools Chief, Jobs May End
Before It Really Starts, Guiliani Bids to Wrestle Control of Beleaguered System, CH. TRm.,
Nov. 13, 1995, at 3 (stating that New York City Mayor, Rudolph Guiliani, is using same
tactics as Chicago's Mayor Daly to gain control over city schools).
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ban communities attract people from all over the country and even
the world, the urban city aspires to attract people to its public
schools. Unlike the exclusive suburban neighborhood school ideal,
the urban public school vision values attracting people to the
school system. Thus, the "attractiveness" rationale offered by the
Kansas City board in Jenkins fits comfortably with the image of
the urban public school.
Finally, it is worth noting the beginnings of an urban educa-
tional aesthetic on the Court. In United States v. Lopez,'6 4 the re-
cent case invalidating the Gun Free School Zones Act as beyond
Congress's Commerce Clause power, Justice Kennedy spoke of ac-
countability and participation in public schools. Dissenting, Jus-
tice Bryer pointed out that there are "guns in the hands of six
percent of inner-city high school students and gun-related violence
throughout the city's schools." 65 Although this emphasizes the
negative part of the urban story, Breyer's opinion is a step in the
right direction because it acknowledges the urban context. The
Court must next develop a sense of the positive urban ideal for use
in school desegregation cases.
CONCLUSION
Missouri v. Jenkins represents yet another school desegregation
decision that sees public schools as suburban neighborhood
schools. Desegregation orders, however, rarely involve suburban
neighborhood schools. Rather, the school boards operating under
desegregation orders are almost invariably urban. The Court
needs a vision of public schools that accounts for desegregation's
urban setting.
64 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1657 (1995).
65 Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1661 (Bryer, J., dissenting).
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